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The  world  of  international  agriculture  in  which  we  find  our-
selves  at  mid-year  1977  is  both  rapidly  changing  and complex.
The  ral)idity  of change  is high-lighted  by  the contrast between
Secretary  of  Agriculture  Butz  speaking  of the  problem  of  scarcity
at the  World  Food  Conference  in  1974 and  Secretary  of Agriculture
Bergland  announcing acreage  set asides  for wheat  in  1977.
The  complexity  relates  to  the  simultaneous  involvement  of
various  sets of  power  relationships  in  the  same  international  agri-
cultural  issues.  The  power  relationships  are:  (1)  North/South
where  developed  world  confronts  developing  world  and  where  our
concern  is the widespread  problem  of  hunger  and  malnutrition  and
the effect  of hunger on  political stability and economic  growth;  (2)
East/West  where  all  issues,  including  those  of  agricultural  trade,
must  be  assessed  in  a  political  context;  and  (3)  North/North,  or
relationships  among industrial democracies,  where our primary con-
cern,  insofar  as agriculture  is  involved,  is  our  own  economic  well-
being.  To  illustrate  the  complexity  that  these  three  sets  of rela-
tionships  bring  to  international  agricultural  issues,  consider  the
proposal  to  constitute  an  international  system  of  nationally-held
grain reserves.  The  World  Food  Conference  of  1974  recommended
such  a  system  to  protect  the  developing  countries  against  the
threat  of hunger resulting from worldwide  short-supply  situations.
It  has  subsequently  become  a  central  theme  of  the  North/South
dialogue.  The main obstacles to the creation  of such a system arise
primarily  from  the  conflicting  commercial  interests  of  developed
grain  exporting countries  and  developed  grain importing countries.
Even  if such  obstacles  can  be overcome,  it will  still be necessary  to
obtain  the  active  cooperation  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  system
since  its  sporadic  pattern  of  market  behavior  has  been  a  major
cause  of market disruption  in  recent  years.  Such  cooperation  pos-
sibly can  only  be  obtained  in the context  of  overall  East/West  re-
lationships.
With such production  changes and  power complexities  in mind,
I  would  approach  my subject  by first looking at the world  we came
from.
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In talking  about  the past, I  will  be talking about  the first half
of this decade.  That  is the time  when the international  agricultur-
al  scene  began  to  change  after  two  decades  of  relative  stability.
Four partly related developments  are  worth noting.  These four de-
velopments  inter-acted  to  elevate  a  relatively  typical  short-supply
situation  into  a  much  lpublicized  "world  food  crisis."  First,  of
course,  were  the  poor  harvests  of  1972-73  and  1974-75.  Second,
were  the  Soviet  and Canadians-United  States  policy  reversals.  For
the first time  the Soviets  decided  to maintain  not only the level  but
the  rate  of  growth  of  their  livestock  industry.  This  decision  led
them  to  make  their  large  scale  grain  purchases  from  the  West.
We and  the Canadians  accommodated  the Soviets by  permitting the
draw down of government-held  grain  stocks.
The  third  development,  the  rapid  increase  in  food  prices,  fol-
lowed  from  the  first  two.  D.  Gale  Johnson  and  Tim  Josling  have
convincingly  demonstrated  that  the  full  increase  in  grain  prices
during the mid  1970's can only  be explained  if trade barriers  which
are a part  of the European  Community's  Common  Agricultural Pol-
icy  are  examined.  While  acknowledging  their arguments,  I  would
limit my list of major developments  to casual  factors, which  initial-
ly  triggered  the  price  increase.  And  finally,  the  period  saw  the
full  scale  emergence  of  the North/South  confrontation.  It  was  in
the  Sixth  Special  Session  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United
Nations that the South pushed  through the resolution demanding a
new  international  economic  order.  It  was  in  Manila  in  early  1975
that  the  Group  of  77  (77  less  developed  countries)  successfully
hammered  out a list of demands  on the developed  world that subse-
quently  formed  the  agenda  for the  United  Nations  Conference  on
Trade  and  Development  and  for  the  Conference  on  International
Economic  Cooperation.  In sum,  it  was  during this period that the
South achieved effective  political  unity.
These  developments  were not  all  of  lasting  importance.  Good
harvests  were  certain  to  follow  poor  harvests.  No  one  is  yet cer-
tain about Soviet  consumption  policies.  Our  own  agricultural  poli-
cies  have changed since then.  Some of the heat of the North/South
confrontation  may  already  have  begun  to  lessen.  What  is  impor-
tant,  however,  is not what happened  but how the developments were
perceived  at the time  and  how  such  perceptions  affected  policies.
The  "Food  Crisis"  and  the  North/South  confrontation  came
together,  in  a  sense,  in  the mind  and  then Secretary  of  State  Kis-
singer and produced the World Food Conference.  Originally  suggest-
ed  by  OPEC  to  deflect  attention  from  the  oil  l)ice  rise, Kissinger
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the  initiative  in  the  North/South  confrontation.  He  and  others
saw the United States  as occupying  a leadership position in agricul-
ture.  The  third  world,  on the other hand,  saw  the proposal  as  an-
other opportunity  to press their claims  on  the developed  world  and,
accordingly, welcomed  the Kissinger  initiative.  Obviously a case  of
parallel but not cooperative  actions.
Five broad  conclusions were reached by the World  Food Confer-
ence  that  served  to  shape  our  food  policy  in  the  following  three
years.  First,  if hunger and  malnutrition  in  the Third  World  were
to  be  eradicated  in our lifetime,  food  production  in  food  deficit de-
veloping countries  must  be  rapidly increased.  The  projection  of  a
grains deficit of up to 100  million tons by the late 1980's  describes  a
problem  for  which  no  other  solution  but  increased  production  in
those nations  is  possible.  Balance  of  payments  and  even  shipping
constraints  rule  against  covering  the deficit through  food  imports.
The decision  to  accelerate  food  production  in  the Third  World  im-
plied  not  only  an  increased  effort  by  developing  countries  but  a
substantially  greater  amount  of  official  development  assistance  in
support  of such  efforts.  Acting upon  this conclusion  in the  years
after  the  conference,  the  United  States  Government  more  than
doubled the Agency for International  Development's budget for food
and  agricultural  development.  This  doubling was  achieved primar-
ily by a refocusing of the Agency's programs.
While  the  first  conclusion  thus  looked  to  long-term  solutions,
the second and third conclusions  acknowledged  the immediate prob-
lem facing many food-deficit  countries  and advocated  interim  solu-
tion.  These  were,  first, that  food-exporting  countries  should  pur-
sue full production policies.  As you know, by crop year 1975  almost
all  of  our  production  controls  had  been  lifted.  Second,  food  aid
should  be  maintained  at  a minimum  global  level  of  10  million tons
and  be  used  more  effectively  in  furthering  development.  Since
1975,  the United  States has stabilized  its food aid at roughly 6  mil-
lion tons or 60  per cent  of  the global  target.  More  recently  it has
revised the authorizing  legislation  (PL 480)  to permit,  among other
things  commitments  of  food  aid  over  several  years  in  support  of
agricultural  development  programs.  The fourth  conclusion  of  the
Conference  was  that an  internationally  coordinated  system of  na-
tionally  held  grain  reserves  should  be  established  to prevent  a re-
currence  of  the  short  supply  situation  of  the  early  1970's.  The
United  States  in  September  1975  presented  at  the  International
Wheat  Council  a  proposal  for  an  international  grains  agreement
with  a  30-million  ton  reserve  component.  Finally,  the  Conference
acknowledged that trade barriers  impede  world food production  and
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hastened.  This conslusion was directed primarily  at the European
Economic  Community  and the  Japanese,  although  trade  restraints
are found in the Third World  and the Communist Bloc  as well as in
the industrial  democracies.  It was consistent with the position the
American  Government had adopted  for the Tokyo  Round  of Trade
Negotiations  under  the  GATT.  It did  not,  however,  buttress  our
position with more than a minimal amount  of moral suasion.
The  food  crisis  did  not translate  into  policy  only through  the
World  Food  Conference  and  resulting  program  changes  by  this
country.  In  fact,  the  crisis  prompted  certain  other  actions  that
probably  undermined  the new  Conference-related  policies.  Shortly
before  the  United  States presented  its reserve  proposal  to  the In-
ternational Wheat Council  (IWC),  it negotiated a 5-year grain trade
agreement  with  the  Soviets.  This  agreement  was  an  attempt  to
deal bilaterally with the Soviets'  increasingly erratic behavior in our
grains  markets.  Our  reserve  proposal  was  presented  in  the  IWC
because  the Soviets  are members of that body.  It was evident that
without Soviet cooperation an international  system of grain reserves
could probably  not be made  to work.  By assuring the Soviets of at
least 8 million tons of wheat and  corn for the next five years, how-
ever,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  grain  agreement  weakened  the
Soviet interest  in participating  in a reserves  system.
A similar development  seems  to have shaped our stance  in the
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  Authorization  for  such  negotia-
tions was finally given by Congress in December, 1974, by means of
the  Trade Act of  1974.  That Act requires  that American agricul-
ture  benefit  from  the  negotiations  equally  with  industry.  The
Congress  thus  seemed  to  echo  the  admonishment  of  the  Spartan
mothers  that  their  sons  should  "Come  home  victorious,  or  come
home  on  their  shields."  Congressional  insistence  in  this  regard
was  stimulated  in part  by the failure  of  the  "Kennedy  Round"  of
trade  negotiations  to  secure major benefits  for United  States agri-
culture.  It may also have  been a reflection  of the strong American
agricultural  trade  situation  that  year.  In  1974  we  were  dealing
from strength and Congress,  in effect,  was saying that the negoti-
ated gain  should  be  commensurate  with  such strength.  The  ques-
tion  posed  is  whether  such  explicit  guidelines  advance  or  retard
progress toward trade  liberalization.
The policies  and programs  that  we initiated  in the first half  of
this decade  thus were not always internally consistent.  They were,
however,  an  accurate  reflection  of the  world  they came  from, and
that  was  a  world  of perceived  agriculture  scarcity.  Because  that
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not fail  to become  entangled  in  and affect that  power relationships
of the time,
The World We  Find Ourselves  In
The second  half of  the  1970's is  different  in both an economic
sense and an attitudinal sense.  Both sets of differences  have impli-
cations  for policy,  and  both  have  already  caused  a  modification  of
the policies inherited  from the early  1970's.
The economic, developments  referred to are of  such importance
that  they occupy  daily  the  attention  of the press  and  government
leaders  and  are  familiar  to  all  of  you.  Seemingly  overnight  the
world  passed from  agricultural scarcity  to agricultural  super-abun-
dance.  This  phenomenon  has  few  geographic  exceptions.  United
States grain stocks have increased from 27  to 61 million metric tons
in the last two years.  The Indians have accumulated  almost 20 mil-
lion tons  of grain.  Even the Soviets  have  to worry  about  storage
space  rather than  availability  of  supply.  Their  record  grain  har-
vest last  year  of  225  million  tons  is  likely  to  be  exceeded  in  the
months  ahead.  Similar  data  could  be  cited  for  almost  all  other
countries.  I  need  not  stress  that  such  harvests  present  govern-
ments  with  problems  as serious  as  those  of  scarcity.  The  debate
which  preceded  the  recent  decision  to  establish  wheat  acreage  set
asides for the next crop year was well publicized.  Perhaps more im-
portant  to  my  subject,  however,  the  situation  brings  about  a  re-
examination by the public of the scarcity conclusion drawn from the
"food crisis" of three years ago.
The  second  important  material change  has been the worldwide
economic  recession  and  slow and  uneven  recovery.  Most of the in-
dustrial  democracies  confront  serious  economic  problems.  In  the
Third  World  the  situation  is  less  uniform.  Some  non-oil  less  de-
veloped  nations,  such  as  the  Asian  industry-led  economies,  have
adjusted  well.  Others  have  maintained  adequate  growth  rates
through  commodity  exports  or foreign  borrowing  or  both.  These
latter now confront fast mounting debts.  A third group simply has
stopped  growing.  Throughout  most of the first half  of the decade
both developed and developing countries enjoyed favorable economic
conditions.  While  policies  regarding  hunger  and  international  ag-
riculture  may not have assumed a need for high  growth rates,  the
general  economic  situation  certainly  was  not  a hindering factor  in
policy formulation.  Today that is no  longer the case.
Turning to the attitudinal  differences,  these are faint but dis-
cernible  signs  that the  North/South  relationship  has  matured,  at
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clusion  is found  in the successful  termination last May  in Paris  of
the Conference  on International  Economic  Cooperation  (CIEC)  and
the  even  more successful  Third Session  of the World  Food  Council
in Manila  last June.  Agricultural  and food issues were a prominent
feature  of CIEC as well as the world Food Council.
It  is  perhaps  significant  that  these  issues  proved  among  the
more amenable  to cooperative  solutions.  Both developed  and devel-
oping  country  participants  have  now  agreed  that  the  problem  of
world  hunger  should  be considered  above  the level  of political  con-
frontation  and  that  the  eradication  of  hunger  is  best  achieved
through  North/South  cooperation  rather  than  North/South  con-
frontation.
The  Communique  at  the  Manila  Session  of  the  World  Food
Council provides  a good illustration of the new tone in North/South
relationships.  In  it the  developing  countries  recognized  their pri-
mary responsibility  not  only for accelerating  agricultural  develop-
ment  programs  but  for modifying  their  social  and political  struc-
tures so as to permit the benefits  of development  to reach the truly
poor.  The developed countries for their part recognized  the political
need  of the South for development  assistance targets  and accepted
such  a commitment.  Admittedly,  two  meetings  are  not  firm  evi-
dence  of a trend in international  relations.  They do,  however, sug-
gest that a  beginning has been made.
In relationship  among developed  countries - the North/North
relationship - there appears to be a feeling that the industrial dem-
ocracies  are  in  a  race  against  protectionism  and  against  growing
agricultural  surpluses.  Such  feelings  of  heightened  concern  have
fortunately  produced  a positive response this summer.  The discus-
sion  between  Secretary of Agriculture  Berglund  and the Economic
Community's  Agricultural  Commissioner  Grundelach  and the  time-
table for trade  negotiations  agreed to  between special  trade  repre-
sentative  Straus  and the EC  reflect a desire  to conclude  efforts  to
liberalize  trade before the pressures for protectionism  and the reali-
ties of agricultural  surpluses  get out of hand.
In brief,  there  appears  to be  a  determination  to cooperate  be-
fore  it is  too  late.  Illustrative  of this new  attitude  have  been  the
statements  of  both  Bergland  and  Straus  regarding  the  EC's  Com-
mon Agricultural  Policy  (CAP).  Frontal attacks  on the CAP have
been  recognized  to be  unproductive  and  perhaps  dangerous  at this
juncture.
There  is a further  attitudinal  change that can  be  seen in both
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ences  North/North  and  North/South  relations.  It  is the  growing
emphasis  on  human rights.  President Carter has  clearly  articulat-
ed this concern.  I  suggest, however,  that it exists  in its own right
and  is not  merely  a policy  of  the  United  States.  Some  historians
have argued that in the regions touched by Western  civilization the
concepts  of liberty  and equality  from a philosophical  cycle.  At the
present the egalitarian phase of the cycle  is peaking.  Thus we find
that the  definition  of  human  rights  is  steadily  expanded  and  ex-
tended to ever increasing numbers  of countries  and peoples.  In the
last several  years the right to food has been included in this "bill of
human rights."  Thus we find Congress  insisting that our develop-
ment effort  work to provide  the  hungry with their basic rights.
The  maturing  relationship  between  North  and  South,  the  de-
termination  of  the  developed  countries  to  maintain  their economic
union,  and the growing concern for human rights necessarily  affect
East/West relations.  It is far too early to attempt to quantify that
effect but it must be recognized.
The Implications  for Policy
The  changes  evident  in  the world we  find  ourselves  in during
the  latter half  of  the  1970's  have  already  caused  modifications  in
American  government policy.  Further changes  may lie ahead.  The
most  striking policy change  is  the recently  established  acreage  set
asides which resulted  from acknowledgement that we do  not live in
a world of permanent scarcity.  These set asides most probably are
not well understood in the developing countries, which may continue
to  believe  they  live  in  a  world  of  permanent  scarcity.  They  are
necessary,  however,  if  we  are  to  maintain  cooperation  among  de-
veloped  countries  and  successfully  conclude  the  trade  negotiations.
Set  asides  state  that the United  States  does not  intend  to  enter a
destructive  export  competition  in grains.  Given the world  surplus
that  we  now  live  with,  they  do  not  threaten  the  developing  food
deficit  countries  in any real  sense.
A related  change  involves  our  international  commodity  policy.
We now realize that widely swinging price cycles do not benefit even
efficient  agricultural  producers  such  as  ourselves.  Consequently,
the United States  has determined  to seek international  cooperation
in moderating  such  price  swings.  Specific  examples  of this policy
involve  proposals  we  have  presented  for  the  international  wheat
and  sugar  agreements.  The  philosophy  underlying  this  shift was
well  expressed  by our delegate  to  the recent  meeting  of the Inter-
national  Wheat  Council.  What  the  new  commodity  policy  means
in the context of the trade negotiations  can probably be summed up
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the American  government  disputes the economic  analysis that dem-
onstrates  the mutual  benefits  that come  from dismantling barriers
to international  trade.  Since such barriers are  not to be dismantled
overnight,  they must be accommodated  in the meantime.  Our com-
modity  policy  is an attempt  to accommodate  them  in the  short run
while  seeking  liberalization  through  negotiations,  over  the  longer
term.
The return  to  agricultural  surpluses  has  served  to  strengthen
rather  than  lessen  our  commitment  to  development  in  the  Third
World  and  to  sharpen  the  focus  of  that  commitment.  We  have
found that hunger and poverty persist in the midst of relative plen-
ty.  The longer-term  solution to the problem of world hunger contin-
ues to be  increased  production  in the food  deficit countries.  Since
most of the hungry are  in the countryside,  such production increas-
es  will  directly  alleviate  their hunger.  AID,  with  this analysis  in
mind, continues  to focus its efforts on the rural poor and the United
States  representatives  in  multilateral  development  institutions  at-
tempt to redirect the programs of such institutions  to a basic needs
approach.  Our food aid program has already been refocused in this
direction,  as  noted  above.  Incerasingly  it  will  be  used  to  support
agricultural  development  programs.
The commitment to eradicate  hunger thus has been reconfirm-
ed.  Programs  have  been  set in motion.  The  real  problems,  how-
ever, remain ahead.  Those problems  are two-fold.  The eradication
of hunger is almost by definition  a long-term project - Do we have
the staying  power?  Second,  because  hunger  in most Third  World
countries  is in large  measure  the result of  the economic  and  social
structures  of those countries,  do their governments  have the politi-
cal will  to follow-up  on the commitment  they have  accepted?
The political developments  and possible  trends discussed  above
have implications for East/West relations.  In a sense the course of
developments  by-passes  the  Communist  countries.  That  is,  rela-
tionships  among  developed  countries  and  between  them  and  the
developing countries  are being determined  without reference  to the
communist  states.  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  assess  the  signifi-
cance  of this situation.  On the  one hand,  the Communist  nations
on repeated occasions  have been a disruptive influence in multilater-
al diplomacy.  Their involvement,  thus, is not always  desirable.  On
the  other  hand,  they  have  become  major  participants  in  interna-
tional  trade.  Such  participation  cannot  be ignored.  Ideally  such
participation  should  be  encouraged.  What broad  conclusion  can  be
drawn from this very sketchy review of the world in which we find
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which  worsen relationships  among developed  countries make  it dif-
ficult  but  not  impossible  for  them  to  address  problems  of  the  de-
veloping  world.  This  situation  is  in  sharp  contrast  to that  which
prevailed  during the first half of the decade.  At that time a strong
economic  boom  made  it relatively  easy,  politically,  for  the western
developed  countries  to  support  policies  designed  to  cope  with  the
problems  of  agriculture  scarcity  that  bore  especially  heavily  upon
developing  countries.  Today  the boom  is  long past.  Although  re-
covery  from recession  has  begun,  for most  it is  a very  sluggish  re-
covery.  The  more  positive  side  of  the  assessment  recognizes  the
new  attitudes  that  appear  to  govern  North/South  relationships.
Where  previously  there  was  largely  shrill  political  confrontation,
which  in  effect  prevented  any  meaningful  North/South  material
cooperation,  today you  see the  first  signs  of  what  I  would  term  a
more  mature  North/South  relationship.
The  agricultural  situation  today  also  makes  it  theoretically
easy to deal  with  the problem  of  world  hunger.  Attitudes and the
realities  of  production  for once  combine  in  a  positive  manner.  On
the other hand,  those realities  could threaten  the current relatively
cooperative  spirit among  the developed  countries.  The final  ques-
tion mark  in this equation  of  relationships  involves  the attitude  of
the  Communist  states.  In  sum,  the  world  we  find  ourselves  in  is
dominated  by uncertainty  moderated  by  hope and  some good sense.
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